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Chapter 11 
Income Generation and 
Intra-Household Decision Making: 
A Gender Analysis for Nigeria 
Diego Angel~Urdinola and Quentin Wodon 
Introdudion 
Household decision making and resource allocation are critical for economic 
and human development. Many decisions made at the household level influ­
ence the welfare of the individuals living in the household as well as their com­
mupities. Decisions such as where to live, how to generate income, how much 
to invest and consume, and how many children to have constitute common 
dilemmas faced by households. The outcomes ofsuch decisions are often linked 
to economic performance at the household level as well as in the aggregate for 
the country as a whole. In households with precarious opportunities (defined 
as living in a low-wealth environment with limited access to credit and limited 
labor opportunities), the intra-household dynamics of decision making and 
resource allocation may have an even greater impact on the welfare outcomes 
of family members. 
Within households, many factors-age, marital status, culture, income level, 
and education-influence the dynamics ofintra-household decision making. If 
various household members (including male, as opposed to female, members) 
have different preferences, it is expected that households will behave differently 
according to who controls household resources. For example, it is often argued 
that when women have better command over income sources, decisions on how 
these resources are spent tend to favor children more in terms of human capital 
investment (for example, Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Bourguignon and 
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Chiappori 1992; Browning and Chiappori 1998; Bussolo, De Hoyos, and 
Wodon 2009). 
Lloyd and Blanc (1996; see also Blackden and Bhanu 1999) argue that 
children in female-headed households in Sub-Saharan Africa have better 
enrollment rates than those in male-headed households. Higher involvement 
of women in decision making within the household has also been shown to 
lead to better outcomes in terms of nutrition (see Piesse and Simister 2002, 
among others). Cooperative bargaining theory suggests that expenditure 
decisions are proportional to resource contribution (for example, Manser 
and Brown 1980; McElroy and Homey 1981). In this respect, as a woman's 
income increases as a share of total household income, so does her bargain­
ing and decision-making power. Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) suggest that 
a doubling of the share of cash income held by women within a household 
may increase the share of the budget allocated to food by the household by 
about 2 percent, and may reduce much more significantly the shares allocated 
to cigarettes and alcohol (by 26 percent and 14 percent, respectively). 
In the Uganda gender assessment prepared by the World Bank (2005), the 
analysis suggested similar differences between male- and female-headed house­
holds, with a higher share of consumption spent on alcohol and cigarettes in 
male-headed households, and a higher share spent on school fees in female­
headed households, especially in the case of divorced and widowed heads. Evi­
dence of the effects of female labor income share on household consumption 
patterns was also found by Backiny-Yetna and Wodon (2010) for the Republic 
of Congo, but the effects were not large and not always statistically significant. 
While there is substantial evidence worldwide about the impact of women's 
income on intra-household decision making, including consumption alloca­
tions, the evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa remains limited, in part as a result 
of lack of comprehensive household surveys to conduct such analysis in many 
countries. However, good household surveys are becoming much more com­
mon, enabling research on gender-based decision making, as illustrated for 
Senegal, for example, by Bussolo, De Hoyos, and Wodon (2009), and for the 
Republic of Congo by Backiny-Yetna and Wodon in Chapter 10 of this volume. 
Yet, even without a comprehensive household survey with detailed consump­
tion and income data, it is still often feasible to conduct useful empirical work 
on these issues. The objective of this study is to document the extent to which 
income generation affects decision making within households in Nigeria, using 
the 2003 Core Welfare Questionnaire Indicator (CWIQ) surveys implemented 
in eight Nigerian states. While these surveys do not have income and consump­
tion data, they do provide information on labor force participation and whether 
household members generate income for the household, as well as data on who 
makes the decisions within the household for a wide range of expenditure cat­
egories. This type of data can be used to assess, using simple statistical and 
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econometric methods, the impact of income generation by women on their 
decision power within the household. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides basic descrip­
tive statistics on the differences in decision making within the household, as 
well as on differences in access to resources between the household head and 
spouse. Thereafter, bivariate probit techniques are used to quantify the extent 
to which income contribution influences a spouse's decision-making power on 
household expenditures in health, education, food, and on the use of productive 
assets. A brief conclusion follows. 
Data and Basic Statistics 
Using data from the CWIQ surveys implemented in eight Nigerian states in 
2003, this section provides basic statistics on the roles of men and women in 
household decision making. The analysis relies on a one-page, special module 
on gender that was added to the standard CWIQ questionnaire by the National 
Statistical Office. Among other questions, the gender module asks respondents 
to answer the following: (1) whether each of the household members engage in 
a number of income-generating activities (fish smoking, food processing, soap 
making, crop farming, fishing, and others); (2) whether household members 
do household chores (fetching water, fetching wood, cleaning toilets, cook­
ing, providing child care, caring for the elderly and the sick, and others); (3) 
whether household members take decisions in a range of areas (health, edu­
cation, food, clothing, use of farmland, and sale of farm produce); and (4) 
whether household members spend most of their time on an economic activity, 
unpaid household work, child care, recreational activities, or other activities. 
The survey also provides information on who contributes the most to house­
hold income. 
This study focuses on an analysis of the correlates or determinants of who 
is the main contributor to household income, and whether this affects the abil­
ity of the household member to participate in decision making in a range of 
areas. Before focusing on the interaction between income contributions and 
decision making" a few basic statistics are useful to provide context. The sur­
vey provides basic statistics showing whether men and women live in poor 
or non-poor households. For such statistics, in the absence of consumption 
data in the survey, poverty is defined using a household-level index of wealth 
obtained through standard factorial analysis conducted on the assets owned 
by the households, with a poverty line defined in such a way as to roughly 
reproduce poverty measures similar to the official figures (according to which, 
about two-thirds of the population lives in poverty). In conducting the factorial 
analysis, the first factor (which is defined statistically as a weighted sum of the 
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various assets used to assess household wealth, in order for that factor to explain 
as much as possible of the variance observed in asset ownership between house­
holds) is used to represent the wealth index. 
The 2003 CWIQ data suggest that, as is the case in many other African coun­
tries, Nigeria is still a male-dominated society. There are significant differences 
in roles played by men and women in Nigeria that influence their capacity to 
earn monetary income, and thus their intra-household decision-making power 
(see table 11.1). While one ofevery two men in Nigeria spends most of his time 
in an income-generating activity, a similar proportion of women spend their 
time in unpaid household work. The differences in economic roles are most 
Table 11.1 Basic Statistics on Employment and Education by Gender in Nigeria 
Non-poor Non-poor Poor Poor 
Women % Men % women % men % women % men % 
Employment and access to capital 
Owns land 13.02 45.85 11.19 35.21 15.02 58.95 
Employed (5-70 years old) 47.38 54.51 45.79 51.39 49.07 57.94 
Main activity (6-70 years old) 
Economic activity 29.41 47.51 37.35 49.75 20.92 45.03 
Unpaid household work 40.64 25.61 30.30 19.02 51.69 32.91 
Takes care of the children 6.00 0.81 4.68 0.78 7.40 0.85 
Recreation 9.15 9.95 9.72 10.10 8.53 9.78 
Other activity 14.81 16.12 17.95 20.35 11.45 11.44 
Education 
literacy rate (all individuals) 39.78 62.41 59.20 81.24 17.80 39.30 
School enrollment (6-15 
years old) 62.40 64.81 83.06 85.94 40.30 43.19 
Reasons to be not enrolled 
Too old 1.67 2.03 1.66 2.43 1.69 1.75 
Completed school 28.06 34.32 17.37 30.41 39.53 37.03 
School is too far 2.43 3.19 2.12 0.00 2.77 5.40 
School is too expensive 26.82 29.03 26.24 34.86 27.45 25.01 
Work (job f home) 7.89 7.55 9.16 8.32 6.52 7.01 
Useless 10.18 12.69 10.64 8.55 9.69 15.55 
Illness or pregnancy 5.39 1.31 5.40 1.52 5.38 1.17 
Failed exam 2.59 11.13 3.40 6.42 1.73 14.38 
Got married 5.27 1.17 4.53 0.00 6.07 1.98 
Awaits admission 17.71 13.34 22.72 17.81 12.34 10.24 
Other reasons 7.53 5.21 10.97 9.62 3.83 2.17 
Source: Authors' estimate USing Nigeria's CWIQ 2003. 
I GDALM_381-406.indd 384 29f06l10 11:55AM I 
INCOME GENERATION AND INTRA-HOUSEHOLD DECISION MAKING 385 
striking in poor households. While only 30 percent of non-poor women engage 
in unpaid family work, the proportion is 52 percent among poor women. 
The literature on Nigeria suggests that women do the most work in the sub­
sistence agricultural sector, while men are given opportunities in the commer­
cial sector. Households often encourage their male members to migrate in order 
to generate higher incomes through remittances and also in order to deal with 
a lack of sufficient farmland and capital in rural areas to make farming profit­
able (Chukwuezi 1999). In turn, male out-migration from rural areas is leading 
to the feminization of agriculture. By contrast, in the commercial sector, men 
are hired more easily than women, including to do weeding and other tradi­
tional woman's work. The monetization of a sector often shifts hiring practices 
in favor of men, with owners of commercial farms justifying the exclusion of 
women on the grounds that they are not able to work at the same pace as men, 
which is, however, doubtful. This may explain in part why when women are 
hired, they are often paid lower wages. 
Despite doing a large share of the work in the agriculture sector, rural women 
often lack control over key farm inputs and decisions. A woman's right to own 
land is dependent on her relationship with her husband or male relatives. The 
risk of losing land rights has become a disincentive for women to invest in land. 
For example, land rehabilitation programs that require years to make land pro­
ductive are not attractive to women who may have the land taken away once 
it becomes fertile. Women also lack control over the allocation of the labor of 
their children and at times even their own labor. In studying tobacco production 
in the north, Babalola and Dennis (1988) found that husbands controlled the 
allocation of their wives' labor. That is, women were assigned tasks in producing 
a labor-intensive crop owned and controlled by their husbands. 
Improved farming methods, while increasing productivity, also increase the 
demand for women's labor. For example, applying fertilizer makes extra weed­
ing necessary, and women do most of the weeding. In contrast, traditional male 
tasks, such as land dearing and preparation, are being mechanized. Access to 
credit is much more widespread for men than for women, who despite hav­
ing better repayment rates, have less access than men. Even when women own 
resources, they may not have the power to make their own decisions about using 
these resources, and this may in turn result in the transfer of more woman­
specific farm tasks (such as the processing and marketing of palm) to men. 
The 2003 CWIQ survey data confirm the existence of differences by gen­
der in decision-making power; these differences are especially pronounced in 
poor households. The empowerment of women in decision making within the 
household seems limited in Nigeria, especially regarding decisions for the use 
of capital goods in the household, such as land use, sale of agricultural produce, 
and decisions related to shelter. As shown in table 11.1, female land ownership 
is rare and the share of women who are the main contributors of income in a 
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household with both head and spouse is very low (at 4 and 3 percent, respec­
tively) for both poor and non-poor households. What is striking is the fact that 
women in non-poor households have much more decision-making power than 
women in poor households for virtually all areas of spending. For example, 
40 percent of women in non-poor households have a say in decisions made 
about education spending, versus only 12 percent of women in poor house­
holds having this say. The same is true for decisions on land use and crop sales, 
with poor women again at a disadvantage. 
The CWIQ data also show that literacy rates are significantly higher for men 
(62 percent for men versus 40 percent for women), and boys benefit from higher 
school enrollment rates than girls. Although net primary school enrollment is 
high and roughly similar for boys and girls in Nigeria, boys are more likely 
than girls to be enrolled by approximately 3 percentage points, and differences 
are larger at higher levels. Family responsibilities affect girls more than boys, 
even at a young age, and tend to magnify differences in schooling. In particular, 
while about 11 percent of girls are not enrolled in school because of marriage 
or pregnancy, this proportion is lower than 3 percent for boys. 
Dealing with gender differentials in Nigeria is a complex matter. For exam­
ple, gender roles are likely to affect human development at the society's level 
beyond the direct impact of decision making within households. One illustra­
tion is the apparent relationship between the sex of teachers and the school 
enrollment rates of girls as teachers, compared to boys, which is documented 
in a risk and vulnerability assessment prepared by the World Bank (2004). 
According to that report, about half the teachers in primary school are female. 
In secondary school, in contrast, the proportion of female teachers is lower. But 
in both primary and secondary schools, there is a clear positive relationship 
between the share of female teachers in a state and the share of female students. 
This relationship does not imply causality, since, apart from the female share of 
teachers, other factors may explain the fact that some states have a higher ratio 
of female-to-male enrollment than others. Still, the relationship suggests that 
gender patterns in Nigeria are correlated and multi-faceted, as well as deep­
rooted in the functioning of society. Therefore, it is important to aim to develop 
integrated strategies to deal with such inequalities. 
Monetary Contributions and Decision Power 
In this section, the analysis focuses on the relationship between monetary 
contributions to household income and decision-making power on expendi­
ture patterns. To do this, we restrict the sample only to male heads and female 
spouses who belong to a household where there is both head and spouse, 
excluding households where there is no spouse, as well as female-headed house­
holds. The reason for this selection is that in order to compare decision power 
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between men and women, it is necessary to have both men and women in the 
household-which, in practice, means that both a household head and a house­
hold spouse need to show up in the data. When there is no spouse, decisions are 
made only by the lone parent, and when there is a female head, in the African 
context, this essentially means that the father or male household head has died 
or has migrated. Note that this exclusion does not lead to bias. It is simply that· 
the analysis is carried over a subset of the population, but this subset is very 
large because most households have both a spouse and a head. For language 
simplicity, "men" will refer to male household heads, and "women" will refer to 
the spouses of household heads. 
As a consequence of various inequalities between. men and women, house­
hold decision-making power in Nigeria remains concentrated among men, 
especially in poor households. Most decisions on the use of productive assets 
(land use, crop sales, and shelter) are taken by men (see table 11.2). Although 
women participate more in decision making on food expenditures, heath, and 
education, men are still the main decision makers in these areas as well. Non­
poor women participate more actively in the household decision-making 
process than poor women, especially in aspects involving health and education. 
Not surprisingly, non-poor women are also more likely to contribute through 
income to household expenses (for shelter, education, food, health, and cloth­
ing, among other things) than are poor women. The rate of contribution for 
non-poor women is 37 percent, versus 27 percent for poor women. 
Decision patterns among men are roughly similar to those of women, 
whether or not the household is poor, although non-poor men are less likely 
than poor men to be involved in decisions involving education and crop sales. 
Table 11.2 Contribution to Household Expenses and Decision Making 
by Gender and Poverty Status in Nigeria 
Women Men 
Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor 
0.04 0.03 0.93 0.93 
DAD 0.12 0.79 0042 
0.54 0.33 0.94 0.90 
0.71 0.53 0.92 0.93 
0.57 0.34 0.90 0.87 
0.22 0.09 0.88 0.85 
0.24 0.14 0.72 0.85 
0.31 0.17 0.58 0.73 
Main contributor of household income 
Decides for expenditures on education 
Decides for expenditures on health 
Decides for expenditures on food 
Decides for expenditures on clothing 
Decides for expenditures on shelter 
Decides for expenditures on land use 
Decides for expenditures on crop sales 
Source: Authors using Nigeria's CWIQ 2003. 

Note: Sample = Heads and SpOUSeS belonging to non-single households. 
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Note that in some cases, the sum of the shares of the decisions made by men 
and women (that is, under our terminology by household heads and spouses) 
is below 100 percent. This is because other members of the households may 
make the decisions in some cases. For simplicity, our analysis here is bivariate, 
comparing household heads and spouses (who tend to make most decisions), 
but further analysis could be made regarding areas where other household 
members playa role. 
Figures 11.1 through ll.8 illustrate how decision making evolves for men 
and women as they age. The graphs show the proportion of men and women 
involved in various decisions by age. There is a difference between decisions 
related to education and other decisions. In the case of education, as shown 
in figure 11.1, as both men and women get older, they are more likely to make 
decisions regarding education; the likelihood increases up to about age 60 and 
decreases thereafter (probably because younger individuals inherit the authority 
of the elder as they become the main providers of household income). Although 
the concave pattern of the decision curve for education is similar for men and 
women, the share of men who are decision makers is always larger than the 
equivalent share of women (the difference between both groups increases up 
to age 60 and then stabilizes). The probable reason for men's decision-making 
power on education increasing with age, and why at a younger age, neither men 
nor women make education decisions, may simply be because younger couples 
either don't have children yet or their children are not yet school age, so there 
are no education decisions to make. 
The pattern for other goods looks more similar between different goods. 
As shown in figures 11.2 through 11.5, comparatively few women from early 
ages are likely to participate in decision making on spending for health, 
food, clothing, and shelter. In contrast, men's decision curves for these items 
are higher, flatter, and decrease only slightly with age. Women are likely to 
get more involved in decision making for these expenditure categories as 
they grow older, although they often reach a plateau relatively quickly. As 
for decisions regarding the use of the household's productive capital (land 
use and sales of productive farm output), women's involvement remains low 
throughout their life cycle, with only a slight increase with age (see figures 
11.6 and 11.7). 
To summarize, this study's findings suggest that women gain in terms of 
empowerment with age for all types of intra-household decision making that 
pertains to non-productive household expenditures. This may in part be a result 
of gains by women in terms of income generating activities as they age. Indeed 
the share of women who are the main source of income in their households 
increases from less than 1 percent among women of age 17 to between 5 percent 
and 10 percent for women above 30 years of age (see figure 11.8). The share 
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Figure 11.1 Decision Making on Education by Age and Gender in Nigeria (%) 
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Figure 11.2 Decision Making on Health by Age and Gender in Nigeria (%) 
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Figure 11.4 Decision Making on Clothing by Age and Gender in Nigeria (%) 
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Figure 11.5 Decision Making on Shelter by Age and Gender in Nigeria (%) 
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Figure 11.6 Decision Making on Sale of Farm Crop by Age and Gender in Nigeria (%) 
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Figure 11.7 Decision Making on Land Use by Age and Gender in Nigeria (%) 
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Figure 11.8 Main Contributor of Income in the Household by Age and Gender in Nigeria (%) 
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of men as the main provider of household income, on the contrary, decreases 
significantly after they have reached age 65. The econometric analysis in the 
next section provides a better assessment of the correlates of decision making 
and income generation. 
Econometric Analysis 
In this section, a simple empirical model is developed to quantify how much 
income contribution by women affects their participation in household deci­
sion making. The analysis assumes that decision making and income con­
tribution are jointly distributed outcomes, which means that both outcomes 
are decided jointly by household members, rather than sequentially. That is, 
the decision to contribute may be influenced by the decision-making power 
acquired in doing so, and similarly, the decision-making power depends on 
the ability to contribute (both outcomes depend on each other). We estimate 
for men and women separately the likelihood of decision making conditional 
on their contribution to the household expenditures, controlling for other 
observable individual and household characteristics that also may influence 
decision making and the probability that individuals contribute income to 
the household. 
The determinants of income contribution and decision making are analyzed 
using a bivariate probit model. The need to rely on pro bits comes from the 
fact that dichotomic variables are observed as outcomes (that is, we observe 
only whether the household head or spouse contributes or not, and decides or 
not). Rather than estimating two probit regressions, we estimate the correlates 
of both outcomes together. because this enables us to assess the impact of one 
outcome on the other. In addition, bivariate probits generate efficiency gains in 
the estimation precisely because they take into account the correlation between 
the error terms of the two regressions for contribution and decision making, 
respectively. The estimation procedure enables us to compute the probability 
of participating in the household decision making conditional on whether the 
individual contributes to household income or not. 
Denoting by D* and C* the latent and unobserved continuous decision and 
contribution variables, by D and C their categorical observed counterparts, and 
by X the vector of independent exogenous variables, the bivariate probit model 
is expressed as: 
D* =f3;X +eD D = 1 if D+ > 0, D = 0 otherwise 
CO =f3~ X +ec C =1 if CO > 0, C =0otherwise (1Ll) 
E[eDJ=E[ecl=O Var[eD ] = Var[ec1 =1 COV[eD.e,] = P 
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The impact of contributing income on the probability of making a decision 
on a particular issue is computed as the difference in the two conditional prob­
abilities of making a decision: 
&=P(D=lIC 1,X)-P(D=1IC O,X). (11.2) 
The set of exogenous variables, X, are age of the individual; household size; 
religion of the household (proxied by the type of household marriage, that is, 
whether Customary, Islamic, Christian, or another type of marriage); education 
of the individual (no education at all, incomplete/complete primary, incom~ 
plete/complete secondary, or tertiary education); a number of employment­
related variables for the individual (employment status: whether employed, 
unemployed, or out of the labor force; type of employment: whether wage 
earner, self-employed, unpaid family worker, or firm owner; sector of employ­
ment: whether agriculture, manufacturing-construction-transport, wholesale­
retail, public administration, or services); and several other variables such as 
whether the household owns a house; has access to electricity, water, and sanita­
tion; whether the household head is a temporary migrant; and regional dum­
mies to control for geographic effects. 
The detailed results from the estimations are provided in the annex. We 
focus here on the estimates of the impact of income contributions to decision 
making using the method outline in equation 11.2. The results are provided 
in table 11.3. When they are the main contributor of income, women win 
substantial decision-making power and thus playa more active role of lead­
ership in the household. The differences in decision power brought about by 
contributing income are largest for food, shelter, and health, where income 
contributions increase the probability of decision making by approximately 
20 percentage points. 
For example, in the case of expenditures for health, the predicted probabil­
ity that women participate in the decision making is 43 percent when they do 
not contribute income, and this increases to 64 percent when they contribute 
income. For men, the corresponding reduction in the probability of making 
decisions for expenditures on health decreases by 18 percent when they do not 
contribute to the household's income. However, even when they contribute to 
cover most ofa household's income, the probability that women will make deci­
sions regarding the use of productive assets, such as land and the commercial 
use of agricultural output, remains low. To some extent, this same result is also 
observed with education. 
An additional finding is that income contribution increases the level of 
decision making among poor women more than among non-poor women 
for health, food, and clothing. These results are provided in table 11.4. Yet for 
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Table 11.3 Impact of Income Contribution on Decision Making by Gender in Nigeria 
Men Women 
Standard Standard 
Probability deviation Probability deviation 
Education 
Decides if contributes 0.53 0.30 0.39 0.29 
Decides if does not contribute 0.36 0.29 0.23 0.25 
Difference -0.17 0.08 -0.16 0.09 
Health 
Decides if contributes 0.94 0.07 0.64 0.20 
Decides if does not contribute 0.76 0.15 0.43 0.24 
Difference -0.18 0.09 --0.21 0.08 
Food 
Decides if contributes 0.94 0.06 0.83 0.14 
Decides if does not contribute 0.82 0.12 0.60 0.25 
Difference --0.12 0.07 -0.22 0.13 
Clothing 
Decides if contributes 0.89 0.07 0.58 0.24 
Decides if does not contribute 0.69 0.12 0.43 0.27 
Difference --0.20 0.06 -0.15 0.05 
Shelter 
Decides if contributes 0.88 0.08 0.34 0.20 
Decides if does not contribute 0.77 0.12 0.16 0.15 
Difference 
--0. " 0.04 -0.19 0.08 
Land use 
Decides if contributes 0.77 0.23 0.27 0.25 
Decides if does not contribute 0.66 0.26 0.16 0.20 
Difference --0.11 0.05 -0.1' 0.07 
Sell agricultural output 
Decides if contributes 0.65 0.25 0.26 0.30 
Decides if does not contribute 0.51 0.25 0.21 0.27 
Difference --0.15 0.04 -0.05 0.04 
Source: Authors estimates using Nigeria'S CWlQ 2003. 

Notes: Estimates based on sample of 10,702 men (household heads) and 13,260 women (spouses); differences 

in size of both samples are due to missing variables. 

decisions involving household productive assets, such as land use, crop sales, 
and shelter, contributing income increases the level of decision making among 
non-poor women more than among poor women. 
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Table 11.4 Impact of Income Contribution on Decision Making by Gender and Poverty 
Status in Nigeria 
Men Women 
Non-Poor Poor Non-poor Poor 
Standard Standard Standard Standard 
Probability deviation Probability deviation Probability deviation Probability deviation 
Education 
Decides if 
contributes 0.72 0.24 037 0.25 0.59 0.26 0.23 0.20 
Decides if does 
not contribute 0.54 0.28 0.20 0.21 0.38 0.26 0.10 0.15 
Difference -0.18 O.OS -{l.17 0.08 -{l.21 O.OS -0.13 0.08 
Health 
Decides if 
contributes 0,96 0,05 0.92 O.OS 0.75 0.18 0.55 0.18 
Decides if does 
not contribute 0.S1 0,13 0.73 0,16 0.55 0.24 0.33 0.19 
Difference -{l.15 O.OS -0,20 0,09 -{l,20 0.08 -0.23 0,0] 
Food 
Decides if 
contributes 0.93 0.06 0,95 0.06 0,S9 0.12 0.77 0,14 
Decides if does 
not contribute O,SO 0.11 0,S4 0,11 0.72 0.24 0.51 0,22 
Difference -{l.13 0,07 -{l.11 0.06 -{l,17 0,13 -{l,26 0,12 
Clothing 
Decides if 
contributes 0,91 0,06 0.87 0.07 0.72 0,21 0.47 0.19 
Decides if does 
not contribute 0.73 0,11 0.66 0.11 0,58 0.25 0.31 0.21 
Difference -{l.lS 0,06 -0.21 0,05 -{l,14 0,06 -{l,16 0,05 
Shelter 
Decides if 
contributes 0,89 0,07 0.87 O,OS 0.45 0,20 0,25 0,14 
Decides if does 
not contribute 0,78 0,11 0.75 0,12 0.23 0,17 0,09 0.09 
Difference -0.11 0.04 -{l.12 0.04 -{l,21 0.D7 -{l,16 0.07 
Land use 
Decides if 
contributes 0.66 0.27 0.86 0.14 0.34 0.24 0,21 0.24 
Decides if does 
not contribute 0.54 0.29 0.77 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.13 0,19 
Difference -0.12 0.05 -{l,09 0.04 -{l.n 0.06 -{l.O9 0,06 
Sell agricultural 
output 
Decides if 
contributes 0.54 0.27 0,76 0,18 0.35 0,29 0.19 0,28 
Decides if does 
not contribute 039 0.26 0.61 0.19 0,2S 0.27 0.15 0.25 
Difference -{l,15 0,05 -{l.15 0,04 -{l07 0.04 -{l,04 0,04 
Source: Authors estimates using Nigeria's CWIQ 2003. 

Notes: Estimates based on sample of 10,702tnen (household heads) and 13,260 women (spouses); differences 

in size of both samples are due to missing variables. 
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Conclusions 
In Nigeria, as in other Sub-Saharan countries, most of household decisions 
are made by men, who are the de facto household heads. Statistical analysis of 
CWIQ survey data suggests that men tend to have most of the decision-making 
power regarding the use of productive assets such as land use, crop sales, and 
shelter. Women participate more often in decisions on expenditures for food, 
heath, and education, but even in these areas, men more often than not remain 
the main decision makers. The decision-making power of women is especially 
low among poor households, in part, because in such households, the likeli­
hood that women will be the main contributor of household income is much 
lower as well. 
Simple econometric modeling suggests that, as expected, when they are the 
main contributor of income, women win substantial decision-making power. 
The differences in decision power brought about by contributing income are 
as large as 20 percentage points for food, shelter, and health spending. How­
ever, the impact is much smaller in relation to the use of productive assets. 
Finally, contribution income raises decision making more among poor than 
non-poor women. 
Care must be taken not to draw strong policy recommendations from the 
limited and descriptive analysis in this chapter. Yet, some broad comments or 
suggestions can be made. This study found that increasing the contribution 
ability ofwomen to household income leads to higher decision-making power 
for them within the household. This has also been shown by several other 
authors to lead to higher investments in the human capital of children, thereby 
leading to poverty reduction and higher income growth in the future. This 
result can be used to advocate for policies to increase women's ability to con­
tribute to household expenditures, including policies raising the human capital 
of women, for example, through training and education programs specifically 
targeting women. Facilitating access to land (for example, through heritage law 
reforms or titling mechanisms) or access to credit (for example, through micro­
credit interventions targeted to women) are all interventions that have proven 
successful in other countries to promote female entrepreneurship and, thereby, 
to increase women's income and bargaining power. However, a detailed analysis 
for Nigeria should be conducted before making any specific policy recommen­
dation in favor of one type of intervention or another to improve the position 
of women in the household. 
GDALM_381-406.indd 397 29106110 11 :55 AM I 
(it 
G> 
0 
» 
E 
I 
'"~ 
~ 
S" w Annex Detailed Regression ResultsQ. <.DQ. 
00 
Co> 

to Table 11A.1 Bivariate Probit Regressions for Women in Nigeria

'" 
Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. 
education income health income food income doth income land income crop sales income 
Number of infants 0.212 -0.033 0.054 -0.033 0.042 -<>.029 0.050 -0.043 0.042 -<>.038 0.087 -<>.043 
under-5 [4.82]"** [O.42J [1.59] [0.43) [US] [0.36] [1.40J [0.54) [0.98] [0.48] [1.93]* [0.55) 
Square of number of -<>.044 -<>.014 -0.013 -<>.011 -<>.008 -<>.013 -<>.014 -0.010 -<>.004 -<>.010 -<>.019 -0.009 
infants [3.84)*** [0.58) [1.69]* [0.51] [1.24) [0.55) [1.65]* [0.44] [0.39) [0.44) [1.62] [0.40] 
Number of children 0.295 0.010 -<>.012 0.029 -0.003 0.025 0.005 0.026 0.033 0.030 -0.019 0.027 
(age 5-14) [7.93]*** [0.18) [0.58J [0.48) [0.15] [0.421 [0.24] ]0.43] ]1.12J [0.49] [0.64] 
of number -<>.039 -<>.007 0.003 -<>.011 0.002 -<>.010 0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -<>.011 0.006 -<>.011 
children [5.341*'- [0.55J [0.97J [0.81J [0.56) [0.77] [O.32J [O.80J [0.221 [0.85J [1.331 [0.84] 
Number of adults 0.189 -0.015 -0.085 0.005 -<>.101 0.010 -0.056 -<>.001 0.049 0.007 0.009 0.012(it [5.44]*** [O.20J [3.53]*** [0.07J [3.93]*** [O.14J [1.96)** [0.02) [1.26J [O.10J [0.24] [0.15J (it 
Square of number -0.013 -0.005 0.006 -0.007 0.006 -<>.007 0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -<>.007 -0.001 -0.007 
of adults [3.96J*** [0.57J [3.03J*** [0.81J [2.84]*** [0.85J [1.09J [0.75J [1.36J [0.81) [0.39] [0.87] 
Number of elderly 0.096 -<>.023 0.055 0.003 0.145 -<>.013 -0.088 -0.028 -0.044 -<>.016 -0.012 -<>.022 
(age 65+) [0.98] [O.13J [0.66] [0.02] [1.68)* [0.08] [1.04] [0.16] [O.42J [0.09] [0.10] [O.13J 
Square of number -0.007 -0.059 -<>.058 -0.061 -<>.082 -0.058 -0.009 -0.052 0.022 -0.053 -0.008 -0.053 
of elderly [0.16J [0.74J [1.59J [0.80J [2.20J** [O.77J [O.25J [0.69J [0.49J [O.72J [0.181 [0.71] 
Female-headed -6.325 2.096 0.684 2.089 6.045 2.120 1.592 2.133 0.094 2.132 0.259 2.089 
household [19.05]*** [2.59]*** [0.98] 12.48J** [31.09]*** [2.63]"* [2.72]*** [2.65J*** [0.15] [2.57]** [0.43J [2.53]** 
Age of household head 0.001 0.025 -0.011 0.D25 0.005 0.023 -0.004 0.023 -<>.010 0.022 -0.038 0.025 
[0.10] [1.23] [0.99J [1.20] [0.45] [1.15] [0.33] [1.12] [0.70] [1.10] ]2.75]*** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[1.05J [1.02J ]1.03] [0.88J [0.94] [0.46J [0.95J [1.02J [0.88J [2.78]*** [1.04J 
Age of spouse 0.042 -<>.003 0.028 -0.001 0.024 0.000 0.015 -<>.001 0.013 -0.001 0.032 -0.004 
[2.78J*" [0.12J [2.26]** [0.07] [1.98)** [0.01) [1.19J [0.03] [0.81] [0.07) [2.14]** [0.19)
'" ~ 

~ 
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Square of age of spouse 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000~ [2.23]** [0.69] [1.73]* [0.63] [1.39] [0.57] [0.98J [0.61J [1.02] [0.63] [1.75]* [0.78J5' 
CI. 
CI. Head has customary 0.073 0.177 0.166 0.187 0.228 0.155 0.110 0.185 0.018 0.188 0.088 0.189 

'" marriage [0.88J [1.29J [1.96[* [1.37] [2.33]** [1.17] [1.21] [1.37] [0.18] [1.38J [0.98]
'" 
'" 
Head has Islamic 0.141 0.192 0.068 0.194 0.155 0.143 0.051 0.175 -0.275 0.197 -0.208 0.202 
[1.29] [1.02] [0.68] [1.03] [1.41] [0.79] [0.49] [0.94] [2.31]** [1.06] [1.76J* [1.08] 
Head has Christian 0.335 0.259 0.405 0.280 0.663 0.246 0.386 0.266 0.172 0.281 0.240 0.270 
]3.40]*** [1.68J* [4.10]*** [1.81]" [5.54]*** [1.63] [3.78]""" [1.74J* [1.62] [1.83J* [2.35]** [1.761* 
Head incomplete 0.113 0.008 -0.086 0.006 -0.120 0.003 -0.059 0.011 -0.005 -0.004 -0.035 0.006 
primary education [1.20] 10.05] [1.03] [0.05] [US) [0.02] [0.70] 10.08J 10.06] [0.03J [0.38] [0.051 
Head completed 0.043 -0.256 -0.046 -0.239 -0.003 -0.247 0.059 -0.246 -0.081 -0.251 0.049 -0.245 
primary education 10.64] 12.26J** [0.81] [2.15]-- 10.06] 12.19]-- [LOS] 12.17]*" [1.18] [2.21]*" [0.66] [2.15]** 
Head incomplete -0.050 -0.155 -0.139 -0.129 0.207 -0.107 0.002 -0.096 -0.232 -0.113 -0.181 -0.118 
secondary education 10.38] 10.87] 10.98] 10.71] [1.47] 10.57] 10.01J 10.53] [1.46] [0.63] [1.29] [0.65] 
Head completed 0.157 -0.320 0.055 -0.291 -0.086 -0.267 0.029 -0.295 -0.128 -0.290 0.043 -0.295 
secondary education [1.54] [1.94]" [0.63] 11.76]- [0.92] [1.60] [0.34] [I. 77]* 11.31] 11.75]' 10.36] 11. 77]* 
Head tertiary education 0.080 -0.171 0.013 -0.147 0.036 -0.132 0.088 -0.142 -0.163 -0.135 0.126 -0.139* *
10.79] 11.02] [0.14] [0.89] [0.37] [0.79] [0.99] [0.84] 11.58] [0.81] [1.20] [0.84] 
Spouse incomplete 0.108 0.336 -0.001 0.329 0.178 0.324 0.041 0.321 0.076 0.347 -0.048 0.335 
primary education [1.23] [2.53]** [0.02] [2.49]" [1.81]' [2.44]** [0.48] 12.42]" [0.81] [2.61]*** [0.50] [2.53]** 
Spouse completed 0.089 0.211 0.041 0.180 0.004 0.193 -0.055 0.175 0.172 0.210 0.086 0.201 
primary education [1.20] [1.81]' [0.63] [1.56] [0.06] [1.64] 10.90] [1.50] [2.24]*' [1.79]' [1.06] [1.72]' 
Spouse incomplete 0.201 . -0.108 0.007 -0.135 0.045 -0.147 -0.021 -0.164 0.252 -0.128 0.073 -0.143 
secondary educ. [1.69]' [0.47] [0.06] [0.56] [0.33] [0.61] [0.16] [0.68] [2.03]** [0.55] [0.59] [0.60] 
Spouse completed 0.067 0.182 -0.174 0.152 0.014 0.144 0.073 0.154 -0.070 0.154 -0.122 0.162 
secondary educ. [0.64] [1.08] [1.82]' [0.89] [0.13] [0.83] [0.76] [0.88] [0.65] [0.88] [1.03) [0.93) 
0.168 0.073 -0.149 0.053 0.075 0.051 -0.007 0.051 0.029 0.079 -0.222 0.081 
[0.99] [0.24] [0.46] [0.23] [0.05] [0.23] 10.19] [0.36] [1.46] [0.37] 
w 
1.0 Head unemployed 0.041 2.147 -0.208 2.105 -0.016 2.194 -0.340 2.198 -0.067 2.193 -0.245 2.193 
1.0 [0.19] 14.75]*** [0.98] 14.66]*** [0.07] [4.86]*** [1.83]* 14.811*** [0.291 [4.83]*** [0.93] [4.86]*** 
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:f Q. Head in servicel -{J.043 -{J.385 -0.093 -0.370 -0.085 -{J.391 0.027 -0.403 -{J.015 -0.385 -{J.228 -0.384Q. 
... educationladm.lother [0.51] 11.95]' [1.28] [1.94]' [1.22] [1.98]-- [0.36J [2.011** 10.17] [1.99J** [2.48]-- 11.99J"51 
Spouse in manuf./constr.l 0.185 0.438 0.075 0.408 -0.114 0.397 0.183 0.409 -0.571 0.435 -0.739 0.424 
transport [1.18] [2.26J** [0.73] [2.05]-- [1.13J [2.06J" [1.781- [2.09J-- [2.58]'" [2.28)** 13.15]**' [2.19J** 
Spouse in wholesalel 0.002 0.121 -{J.069 0.124 -{J.205 0.114 0.027 0.125 -0.543 0.133 -0.525 0.127 
retail [0.03] [1.34] [1.23J [1.37] [3.57]'" 11.26] [0.49] [1.38] [8.91]'" [1.47] [8.48J'" [1.40J 
Spouse in serviceleduc.l 0.059 0.324 0.433 0.317 -0.028 0.311 -0.037 0.304 -0.645 0.287 -0.676 0.292 
adm.lother [0.70] [2.25]-- [6.64]'" [2.21]" [0.45] [2.14J" [0.59] [2.10]" [6.37]'" [2.00]" [7.78]**' [2.02]" 
Individual owns house 0.365 0.395 0.319 0.375 0.851 0.389 0.462 0.367 1.204 Q.401 1.078 0.396 
[4.54]'" [3.57]'" [4.84]'" [3.36]'" [10.35]'" [3.50]'" [6.88]**' [3.35]'" (16.51]**' [3.64]**· [12.95]*" [3.64]**' 
Head temporary migrant 0.226 1.203 0.220 1.167 -{J.151 1.163 -{J.120 1.175 -{J.451 1.194 -{J.328 1.202 
[0.80] [5.33]'" [1.19] [5.17]'" [0.86J [5.12]'" [0.70J [5.20]'" [1.87]' [5.28]"· [1.49] [5.39]*** 
Household has access to 0.046 0.120 0.067 0.121 0.004 0.123 0.068 0.121 -{J.014 0.121 0.032 0.122 
electricity [2.05]·· [3.24]'" [3.19]--' [3.30]--- [0.16] [3.30]--- [3.33]--- [3.26]'" (0.52] [3.33]--· [1.31] [3.30]'"(f) (f)Household has access to 0.077 -0.174 -{J.129 -0.166 -0.121 -0.179 -0.011 -0.167 -{J.078 -0.164 0.017 -0.164 
piped water [1.03] [1.24] [1.86]- [1.19] [1.73]' [1.27] [0.16] [1.19] 10.81] [1.17] [0.17] [1.17] 
Household has toilet -0.005 0.122 0.092 0.126 -0.021 0.155 0.047 0.129 -0.479 0.127 -0.336 0.113 
facility 
Wealth index 0.129 -0.043 0.022 -{J.041 -0.067 -{J.033 -0.028 -0.045 -0.019 -0.041 -0.033 -0.038 
[3.82J··- [0.74J [0.74] 10.70J [2.05J" [0.55J [0.911 [0.77] [0.52] [0.70] [0.86] [0.65) 
Wealth index squared -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.005 -{J.004 0.001 -{J.003 0.000 -0.003 -{J.OOl -{J.003 
12.75]'" [0.50] [0.41) (0.58) [1.65\' [0.74\ [0.48\ [0.53] [0.14] [0.63\ [0.42] [0.64) 
Constant -2.636 -4.279 -{J.81 0 -4.328 0.289 -4.470 -0.446 -4.365 -1.109 -4.415 -0.430 -4.428 
[6.80]'" [5.72]·' • [2.56)** [5.77]'" [0.92] [5.71]**' [1.47] [5.63)--- 13.08)'·' 15.73]'" [1.16] [5.69)'" 
Observations 13225 13225 13225 13225 13225 13225 13209 13209 13209 13209 13209 13209 
Source: Authors' estimates using Nigeria's CWlQ 2003. 
Notes: State dummy variables induded in the regressions but not shown in the tables. (*) denotes coefficient statistically significant at 10% level, (**) at 5% level and (* **) significant 
.j:>. at 1% level. 
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Table 11A.2 Bivariate Probit Regressions for Men in Nigeria 
Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. 
1G education income health income food income cloth income land use income sales income 
Number of infants 0.232 0.033 0.016 0.033 -0.079 0.033 0.029 0.038 0.089 0.036 0.037 0.038 
under-S [5.4S]*** [0.76] [0.40] [0.74] [2.02]" [0.74] [0.771 [0.85J [2.5SJ" [0.811 [1.22J [0.861 
Square of number of -0.029 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.014 -0.005 -0.005 -O.OOS 
infants [2.79]'" [0.53J [1.30J [0.S7] [0.13J [0.61] [1.05J [0.67J [1.79]' [0.69] [0.84] 10.69] 
Number of children 0.564 0.035 0.079 0.033 0.041 0.033 0.052 0.034 0.055 0.031 0.015 0.031 
(age 5-14) 117.04J'** [0.86J [2.02]'* [0.87] 11.0SJ 10.88J [1.68)' [0.90) [1.71]* [0.83) [0.55] [0.82] 
Square of number -0.070 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 . -0.004 
of children [10.44]'" [0.45] [1.18] [0.61] [0.01] [0.59J [0.79] [0.60J [0.28J [0.56] [0.02J [0.S6] 
Number of adults 0.222 -0.116 -0.052 -0.106 -0.106 -0.113 -0.037 -0.110 0.095 -0.116 0.045 -0.116 
[6.68)'" [2.25)" [1.00) [2.15)** [2.00]" [2.22J** [1.07) [2.20]** [2.61]'" [2.261** [1.36] [2.261** 
Square of number -0.012 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.010 -0.005 0.011 -0.001 0.011 
of adults [3.64]*** [1.86)* [1.32] [1.791* [1.79]' [1.90]* 10.30] [1.86J' [1.54] [1.92)' [0.26) [1.93]­
Number of elderly 0.116 -0.135 0.217 -0.147 -0.048 -0.145 0.180 -0.119 0.035 -0.143 -0.130 -0.135 
(age 6S+) [1.08] [1.06J [1.46] [US] [0.36] [1.11J [1.56] [0.92J [0.29] [1.09] [1.24] [1.04J* * 

Square of number -0.030 0.019 -0.071 0.030 -0.008 0.034 -0.057 0.022 0.015 0.026 0.058 0.024 
of elderly [0.57J [0.36) [1.13] [0.56) [0.14) [0.61] [1.10J [0.40] [0.28] [0.47] [1.19) [0.441 
Female-headed -7.759 -1.265 -0.711 -1.213 -1.452 -1.195 -1.369 -1.224 -0.625 -1.277 -0.289 -1.250 
household [26.90]'" [1.74)- [1.06) [1.63] [2.18J** [1.63) [1.80J- [1.58J [0.84J [1.68]' [0.38) ]1.64) 
Age of household head 0.014 Om5 0.047 0.Q18 0.012 0.016 0.026 0.016 0.004 0.019 0.012 0,018 
[1.11) [0.841 [3.07)'" [1.001 [0.81[ [0.93] [1.91)' [0.90J [0.31] [1.08) [0.92J [1.061 
Square of age of 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
household head [1.311 [1.49J [3.76]'" [1.65)' [1.421 [1.56] [2.72]**- [1.561 [0.61] [1.721- [1.21] [1.691­
Age of spouse 0.022 0.029 -0.031 0.025 0.000 0.028 0.008 0.027 0.014 0.025 0.006 0.025 
[1.561 [1.52) [1.86)- [1.331 [0.01) [1.471 [0.511 [1.44] [0.98] [1.29] [0.441 [1.32J 
Square of age of spouse 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[1.24J [2.11)** [1.68]- [1.96]-- [0.25] [2.14]" [0.38] [2.08]-' [US] [1.921- [0.68J [1.961­
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Cl. 	 Head has customary 0.316 -0.343 -0.152 -0.378 0.100 -0.376 0.024 -0.373 0.089 -0.356 -0.031 -0.358 
.j>. marriage [3.07]*** [2.66]"* [1.00] [2.88]*** [0.86] [2.83J*** [0.22] [2.89]*** [0.90J [2.77J*** [0.34] [2.76]***8 

Head has Islamic marriage 0.403 -0.154 -0.178 -0.182 -0.254 -0.185 -0.080 -0.178 -0.150 -0.168 -0.210 -0.160 

[3.19]'" [0.94J [1.16] [1.08J [1.92J* [1.11J [0.66J 11.07] 11.31J 11.02J 12.01J** 10.95J 

Head has Christian 0.436 -0.481 -0.112 -0.509 0.150 -0.503 -0.048 -0.517 0.062 -0.498 0.089 -0.490 
13.61]*** [3.31]*" [0.66] [3.50J*** [1.14J [3.40]*** [0.38] 13.58]*** [0.57] [3.46]*** [0.89] [3.39J.... 
primary 0.254 -0.006 0.249 -0.012 0.163 -0.013 -0.010 -O.Q15 0.211 -0.006 0.114 -0.006 
education 12.42]** 10.05J 11.44] [0.10] [1.40J [0.10J 10.1 OJ 10.12] 11.78J* 10.05J [1.19J [0.05] 
Head completed primary 0.320 0.310 0.093 0.300 0.193 0.311 0.127 0.286 0.176 0.309 0.124 0.314 
education 14.75]**' [3.21]*" [1.10] [3.10J*** 12.28J** [3.19J*** [1.59J [3.01]*** [2.46]" [3.16]'" [1.94]* [3.20]*** 
Head incomplete 0.226 0.077 0.015 0.053 0.115 0.074 0.108 0.043 0.147 0.Q75 0.093 0.078 
secondary education [1.49] [0.28] [0.09] [0.20] 10.69] [0.27] [0.74] [0.16] [1.09] [0.27] [0.79] [0.28] 
Head completed 0.355 0.063 0.136 0.102 0.183 0.081 -0.029 0.076 0.061 0.076 0.197 0.088 
secondary education [3.63]*** [0.45J [1.051 [0.73] [1.49] [0.571 [0.24] [0.54] [0.65] [0.54J [2.25]*' [0.62] (fJ Head tertiarv education 	 0.430 0.085 0.172 0.109 0.220 0.118 0.128 0.081 0.083 0.113 0.228 0.119 (fJ 
[3.69]*** [0.63] [1.13) [0.81J [1.67]* [0.88] [1.02J 10.60] 10.82] [0.84] 12.37J** 10.88] 
Spouse incomplete 0.163 -0.208 -0.051 -0.202 -0.326 -0.240 0.123 -0.212 -0.048 -0.234 -0.232 -0.239 
primary education [1.54] [1.72J* [0.30J [1.66J' [2.851*** [1.97J" [1.01] [1.76J* [0.41] [1.92]' 12.38J** [1.95]' 
Spouse completed primary 0.148 -0.072 -0.004 -0.102 -0.153 -0.106 0.060 -0.089 0.097 -0.094 0.045 -0.099 
education [1.88]' [0.62] [0.04] [0.89] [1.64] [0.92] [0.661 [0.791 [UO[ [0.81] 10.64) [0.85] 
Spouse incomplete 0.345 -0.146 -0.281 -0.111 -0.284 -0.127 -0.056 -0.105 -0.004 -0.132 -0.081 -0.132 
secondary educ. [2.24J" [0.70J [1.55] [0.56J [1.90]' [0.61] [0.381 10.53] [0.03] [0.65] [0.70] [0.65] 
Spouse completed 0.082 0.071 -0.067 0.071 -0.216 0.046 -0.036 0.068 -0.210 0.050 -0.298 0.049 
secondary educ. [0.72] [0.48] [0.45] [0.48] [1.56] [0.31] [0.26] [0.471 ]1.97]" [0.34] [3.02]'" ]0.34] 
Spouse tertiary education 0.095 0.220 0.212 0.188 -0.088 0.164 0.073 0.215 -0.001 0.182 -0.220 0.171 
[0.52] [1.15] ]0.84] [0.99] [0.47] ]0.85] [0.42] [1.11] [0.01] [0.94] 11.56] 10.89] 
Head unemployed -0.499 -1.492 -0.541 -1.455 -0.312 -1.507 -0.051 -1.455 -0.160 -1.502 -0.141 -1.507 
./::> [2.30]** [4.79]'" [2.00]" [4.72]'" [1.21] 14.88]*** 10.18J [4.63J'" 10.71] 14.81]'" [0.69] ]4.80]*" 
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0- 0 Table 11A.2 Bivariate Probit Regressions for Men in Nigeria continued 
... 
~ 
Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib. Decide Contrib.~ 
education income health income food income cloth income land use income crop sales income 
Head not in labor force -{J.618 -1.525 -{J.858 -1.479 -{J.428 -1.522 -{J.443 -1.481 -{J.358 -1.520 -{J.200 -1.509 
[3.341*** [5.331*** [3.66]'" [5.25]'" [1.91[* [S.40J'" [1.81]* \5.17]'" 11.87]* [5.31]-" [1.19) /5.26]'" 
Head in public or -{J.063 -{J.186 0.136 -0.173 -{J.201 -0.157 -{J.401 -{J.169 -{J.099 -{J.175 -{J.270 -{J.162 
parastatal sector [0.351 [0.97] [0.57] [0.90] [1.01[ [0.81] [2.39]" 10.89] [0.81] 10.92J [2.06]" 10.85] 
Head wage earner -{J.075 -{J.043 -{J.452 -0.062 0.061 -{J.1 02 0.297 -{J.062 0.041 -{J.083 0.188 -{J.094 
10.35] 10.14] 11.44] [0.21] [0.23 [ [0.35J 11.111 10.211 10.21] [0.28] [1.011 [0.31] 
Head self employed -{J.423 -{J.138 -{J.277 -0.129 0.177 -0.154 -{J.025 -{J.143 -0.100 -{J.151 -0.069 -{J.161 
[2.621'" [0.55] [1.37] 10.521 [0.891 [0.62] [0.11] [0.56] [0.58] [0.59] [0.47] 10.62] 
Head unpaid family -{J.518 -{J.486 -0.602 -{J.484 0.241 -{J.503 -{J.139 -{J.493 -{J.177 -{J.494 -{J.089 -{J.503 
worker [2.95]**' [1.81]' [2.83]'"" [1.83]' 11.07] [1.90]' [0.56] 11.84]' [0.92] [1.82]' [0.541 [1.84]" 
Spouse unemployed -{J.160 0.589 -{J.OO7 0.598 0.270 0.619 -{J.150 0.564 0.067 0.627 -{J.140 0.575(f) (f)[0.521 [2.04]" [0.02] [2.10]"" [0.791 [2.18J·- [0.51J [1.981'- [0.261 [2.20)** [0.60J [2.01J·· 
Spouse not in labor force -{J.112 0.431 0.200 0.415 0.568 0.456 0.293 0.399 0.271 0.440 -{J.014 0.395 
[0.39J [1.63) [0.63J [1.611 [1.77]- [1.75]' [1.11] 11.52J 11.13) [1.68J· [0.06J 11.50] 
Spouse in public or -0.217 0.069 -{J.501 0.036 0.273 0.072 -0.397 0.041 -{J.142 0.053 0.161 0.062 
parastatal sector [0.86] 10.30] [1.66]- [0.16] [1.08] ]0.311 [1.72[' [0.18] [O.63J [O.23J [O.83J [O.27J 
Spouse wage earner -0.322 -{J.802 0.059 -{J.754 0.093 -{J.746 0.256 -{J.775 0.166 -0.757 -{J.245 -0.808 
[0.95] [2.56)** [O.15J [2.42]** [0.26) [2.39'** [0.83' [2.45'" [0.55] [2.45)** 10.89) '2.61J""" 
self employed -{J.160 -{J.251 0.517 -{J.255 0.468 -{J.238 0.363 -{J.268 0.273 -{J.251 0.248 -{J.287 
[0.57J [1.03] [1.68)' [1.07[ [1.48] [0.99] 11.44) [1.11] 11.18] [1.04) [1.17) [1.18) 
Spouse unpaid family -{J.236 -{J.084 0.056 -{J.088 0.538 -0.064 0.013 -{J.l00 0.290 -{J.on 0.037 -{J.101 
worker [0.84] [0.34) 10.18] [0.361 [1.671' 10.271 [0.05] [0.411 [1.24] [0.30] [0.17) [0.41] 
Head in manuf.lconstr.l -{J.115 0.156 0.029 0.155 0.085 0.156 0.002 0.152 -0.527 0.149 -{J.S70 0.134 
transport [1.101 11.161 10.20] [1.16J 10.71] [1.17J 10.021 11.141 15.57]'" [1.12J [6.57J"- [1.00J 
Head in wholesale/retail -0.011 -{J.060 -0.183 -{J.089 0.088 -{J.076 -0.114 -{J.093 -0.426 -{J.073 -{J.420 -{J.083 
[0.13J [0.48J [1.67]' [0.70J [O.75J 10.60] [1.21] [0.741 ]5.31J'" [0.56] [5.72J**' [0.64J
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"- Head in service/education! -0.066 0.132. -0.088 0.098 0.044 0.113 -0.114 0.092 -0.397 0.115 -0.374 0.103 

... adm.lother [0.78] [0.76] [0.72] [0.56] [0.46] [0.65] [1.23] [0.53] [4.79]*'* [0.66] [4.70]*** [0.59]
0 
'" 	 Spouse in manuf.lconstr.l 0.160 -0.394 -0.130 -0.411 0.146 -0.419 0.109 -0.426 -0.573 -0.412 -0.574 -0.415 

transport [1.13] [2.29]** [0.90] [2.44]** [0.85] [2.48]** [0.75] [2.53]" [4.27]*** [2.39}" [4.51]*** [2.41]" 

Spouse in wholesale/retail 0.002 0.098 0.092 0.109 0.140 0.114 -0.011 0.110 -0.465 0.118 -0.467 0.123 
[0.03] [1.16} [1.16] [1.28] [1.65]' '[1.36] {0.17J [1.29] {6.88J' " [1.38) [7.80]'" [1.44] 
Spouse in service/educ.l 0.103 -0.191 0.628 -0.186 0.309 -0.196 0.312 -0.185 -0.256 -0.199 -0.110 -0.187 
adm.lother [1.41] [1.69]' [6.44]'" [1.63] [2.79J'" [1.73J' [3.49J'" [1.62] [3.02J'" [1.74]' [1.53J [1.64] 
Individual owns house 0.099 0.034 . 0.204 0.041 0.109 0.033 0.094 0.038 0.800 0.031 0.736 0.033 
[1.84]' [0.47] [2.95]'" [0.57] [1.76]' [0.45] [1.57] [0.53] [16.09]'" [0.42] [15.53]'" 10.46] 
Head temporary migrant -0.307 -0.778 -0.149 -0.754 -0.252 -0.738 0.247 -0.744 -0.148 -0.759 -0.047 -0.761 
[1.55] [3.58]'" [0.62] [3.49J'" [1.21] [3.391'" [1.24] [3.43]'" [0.68] [3.541'" [0.24] [3.57J'" 
Household has access -0.029 -0.087 0.038 -0.093 0.036 -0.094 0.017 -0.092 0.003 -0.092 0.002 -0.090 
to electricity [1.19] [2.51]' , [1.07] [2.68]'" [1.20] [2.72]'" /0.56] [2.73]'" [0.12] [2.70J'" [0.09J [2.61]*" 
Household has access 0.183 -0.221 -0.244 -0.237 -0.072 -0.211 -0.076 -0.216 0.043 -0.216 -0.060 -0.210 
to piped water [2.33J" [1.93J' [2.39J" [2.07J" [0.66] 11.82J' [0.84] [1.89J' [O.5St 11.87]' [O.86J [1.82J'* 	 * 
Household has toilet -0.122 0.157 -0.236 0.134 -0.300 0.137 -0.317 0.139 -0.178 0.157 -0.134 0.140 
[0.76] [1.00J [1.17] [0.83] [2.03]" [0.84J [1.98J** [0.86] [LSI] [0.96J [1.14J [0.86] 
Wealth index 0.131 -0.014 0.112 -0.004 0.148 -0.011 0.152. -0.003 -0.099 -0.014 -0.035 -0.015 
[3.61J'" [0.291 [2.40J" [0.09] 13.36]'" [0.22] [3.61]'" [0.07] 12.61J'" [O.28J [0.95] [0.30J 
Wealth index squared -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.004 -0.011 0.004 -0.008 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.006 0.004 
[1.45J [1.00J [1.16] [0.85] [2.81]'" [0.91] [2.12]" [0.84J [0.25] [O.96J [1.70J' [0.971 
Constant -1.696 2.159 0.202 2.158 0.117 2.194 -0.575 2.207 0.199 2.205 0.085 2.249 
[4.10]'" [4.34]'" [0.44J [4.331'" [O.26J [4.39]'" [1.39] [4.41J**' [0.52J [4.41J'" [0.24J 14.48J··' 
Observations 	 10671 10671 10671 10671 10671 10671 10671 10671 10671 10671 10671 10671 
Source: Authors' estimates using Nigeria's CWIQ 2003. 
Notes: State dummy variables induded in the regressions but not shown in the tables. (') denotes coefficient statistically significant at 10% level, (' ') at 5% level and (' ") significant 
at 1% level. 
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